We enable people to create, distribute, manage and monetize native and mini apps - at the speed of producing TikToks,
Reels and
Shorts.
Apps are becoming user generated content. AI now writes most of the code, so one person can ship a working app in a weekend, the way the phone camera once turned everyone into a video producer. The hard part has moved from building the app to everything after it.
We build that missing layer: tools to create, distribute, manage and monetize apps at the speed people produce TikToks and Reels. Creators build native and mini apps in each platform's own stack, deploy on our managed cloud, and reach users through @appss, a store driven by a social graph rather than search.
We are an ex-Telegram team, and we hit these problems building apps ourselves. Notspy, a portfolio app on our own stack, runs profitably with 115K real users. The tooling started as what we needed to operate; we packaged it so any creator can run the same playbook.
Apps are turning into content. AI writes most of the code now, so building one is no longer the hard part: a single person can ship a real app in a weekend. What's still hard is everything after the build - getting it in front of users, keeping them, handling identity, payments, support, and the numbers. That work used to need a funded studio. It still does, unless someone packages it.
@appssPro is that package: one place to research, build, launch, grow, and monetize an app - built native to each platform's own stack: a Telegram app, a WhatsApp Flow, a TikTok mini, a YouTube playable, each in the real SDK and UI of the ecosystem it lives in. Creators build with an AI builder that knows those formats, deploy onto a managed cloud, and push their apps into @appss, a store that runs on a social graph instead of a search bar, so reach comes from people sharing and voting rather than ad budgets. We monetize the toolkit like a SaaS, and the audience those apps bring into the store on top of it - so subscriptions are the floor of the model, not the ceiling.
And it's already working, proven on our own apps first: Notspy, a portfolio app we built on the stack, runs profitably with 115K real users - alongside thousands of creators now building on it and thousands of apps live in the store. The proof isn't raw ecosystem reach; it's real users moving through apps we shipped ourselves. The people behind it are operators who hit these problems the hard way and decided to fix them for everyone else.
Attention loop mastered — edit it, post it, and the feed spreads it in seconds. Analytics, monetization — everything is built in.
A separate grind at every step — months to build, store review to pass, and every install is one you pay for.
Every mass format of self-expression followed the same pattern: creation gets cheap, then a distribution loop turns it into an economy. Text had blogs, photos had Instagram, short video had TikTok. Each time, the tool arrived first, and the platform that mastered the loop captured the format.
We think interactive apps are next. Vibe-coding did for software what the phone camera did for video: anyone can now make a working app in an evening. The supply is already shifting toward small, personal, entertainment-first apps that behave more like content than like products.
What apps still lack is the loop the earlier formats had built in: instant publishing, a feed, analytics, monetization. Video closed that gap and became the dominant format of a decade. We are not creating this wave. We are the infrastructure catching it.
Fish / draft. The problem narrative goes here: self-expression is moving from passive video to interactive experiences, and for the first time anyone can make one. But the creation-and-distribution stack that content already has does not exist for apps yet, and that gap is the opening.
A Reel needs no install. It appears in the feed, the algorithm tests its reach in seconds, and it either holds attention or it does not. A mini app works the same way. It lives inside a platform that already has the users and rides that platform's distribution.
There is no download and no store review. The app opens where the user already is, one tap from a post or a message. Distribution stops being a separate problem to solve after launch; the host platform's feed and social graph do that work.
The same mechanics that move a video move an app. A user shares a result, a friend opens it, someone remixes it into their own version. An app can trend, decay, and hand off to the next one, the way content does. We build for that cycle.
The classic app lifecycle ran in years. Build for 12–24 months, optimize retention, fight for every percent in DAU, hope to survive a decade. The unit-economics required well-funded studios and venture timelines.
The UGC-app lifecycle runs in weeks. A creator vibe-codes an idea in days, deploys natively across messengers in one tap, posts content about it in the same network, and lives off the peak. When the trend cools, the app archives. The strongest mechanic gets ported into the next one.
Classic app: $50K–$5M cost · 6-24 months build · 3-10 year lifecycle if it survives · few big bets · binary failure cost.
UGC app: $0–$5K cost · days-weeks build · 2-12 week active phase · many small bets · negligible failure cost.
The same mechanic gets iterated, improve hook, port the format to a new niche, ship the next observation as its own app. Compound advantage moves from any single app → creator's reputation and audience, exactly how it works for YouTubers and short-form creators today.

Building an app is no longer the hard part, everything after it is. This packages all of it, so one creator launches, grows and monetizes like a funded studio.


A real store that runs on a social graph, not a search bar, so apps spread through people who share, follow and vote, instead of fighting for a ranking.
@appss Pro is the operating system creators work in. Building the app stopped being the hard part; everything after it is. Pro packages that part: research, hosting, analytics, push, payments, support, sixteen tools under one subscription, native to each mini-app ecosystem. One creator ships like a funded studio.
@appss is where those apps meet users. It is a real store inside the messenger, built on a social graph rather than a search bar. People follow creators, review, share and vote, so apps spread through people instead of fighting for a ranking.
The two feed each other. Every app shipped through Pro lands in the store, and every user the store gathers is a candidate for the next app. Tools bring creators, creators bring apps, apps bring users. That loop is the company; neither product compounds alone.
@appssPro is what creators pay for (and ship from). It's a launch-cycle OS: market research, build, design, host, distribute, attribute, push, monetize, support, natively for the mini-app surface they choose.
@appss is the consumer-facing store, installed inside Telegram today, ported to messengers next. Users browse, review, follow creators, stake Stars, earn. It's a YouTube-shape consumer surface, not a curated catalog.
Every app shipped through @appssPro lands in @appss. Every user on @appss becomes a candidate for installing more apps. Both products compound each other. Vercel + AppsFlyer + Lovable could never have done this, they had no audience aggregator on top.
«One subscription replaces 10 tools. One store distributes them all. The economics are SaaS at the floor and aggregator at the ceiling.»
Building an app is now the cheap part. A coding agent gets you a working mini-app in days; that is the five percent. What stops creators is everything after: knowing what to build, getting installs, keeping users, taking payments. The build step is a commodity. The rest is the product.
@appss Pro packages that rest as one workflow: 16 tools across Research, Build, Distribute and Monetize, from Market Research and App Remix through to Channel Attribution and Push Management, under one subscription. Creators do not have the budget to glue ten standalone tools together, so we sell the workflow, not the parts.
Every capability is also an AI action surface. Plug Claude or ChatGPT in and drive any tool from chat: track a competitor, send a push to a churned cohort, generate a referral landing. Work front-loads in research and build, then drops, while users and revenue keep compounding on the same stack.
Each capability replaces a stand-alone tool from the web/native world, but built around messenger primitives (Stars, init_data, channel attribution, bot rails) so it actually works for mini-apps.
Mini-app creators don't have engineering budgets to glue 10 stand-alone tools. They need one cohesive workflow where build → ship → grow → monetize happens in continuous flow. We sell the workflow, not the parts.
Each capability exposes an AI action surface, Claude / ChatGPT plug in and drive any of the 12 capabilities through chat. «Track this competitor app», «Send a push to my churned cohort», «Generate a referral landing», all happen inside the chat thread, executed against the stable stack.
«Build is commodity. We sell the full launch cycle as a single creator workflow.»
| # | App | MAU | App surface |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 3.07B | ✓Instant Games | |
| 2 | 3.0B | ✓Flows (Chatbots with basic UI) | |
| 3 | 3.0B | ✓DM Chatbots | |
| 4 | 2.7B | ✓Playables (Games) | |
| 5 | 1.6B | ✓Minis | |
| 6 | 1.41B | ✓Mini Programs | |
| 7 | 1.0B+ | ✓Mini Apps | |
| 8 | 765M | ✓Apps, Interactive Posts | |
| 9 | ~700M | ✓DM Chatbots | |
| 10 | 586M | - |
| App | Top # | Region | Last significant update |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 🌐 | Aug 2025 · Instant Games SDK v8.0 | |
| 2 | 🌐 | Sep 2025 · Flows v7.2 + Image Carousel | |
| 5 | 10 reg. | Dec 2025 · Minis live in 10 markets | |
| 6 | 🇨🇳 | Jan 2026 · 70 mini-games > 1M DAU | |
| 7 | 🌐 | Mar 2025 · 1B MAU + Stars monetization | |
| 9 | 🌐 | Aug 2025 · Instant Games SDK v8.0 | |
| - | 🇨🇳 | Nov 2025 · Apple cuts mini-app fee to 15% | |
| - | 🇯🇵 Asia | Oct 2025 · Web access + ads + IAP | |
| - | 🌐 | Mar 2026 · Game Shop + Social Commerce | |
| - | 🇰🇷 | Sep 2025 · Feed redesign + Kanana AI | |
| - | 🇻🇳 | Dec 2025 · 1,205 government mini-apps | |
| - | 🌐 | Discontinued 2022 (dormant) |
Nine of the world's ten largest apps now host an app surface: Instant Games on Facebook, Flows in WhatsApp, Playables on YouTube, Minis on TikTok, Mini Programs in WeChat, Mini Apps in Telegram, Devvit apps on Reddit. Only X has none. Distribution is moving inside the apps people already open.
We checked the ceiling ourselves, on real devices in China this August: ten platforms, hands on. The top four apps there, WeChat, Alipay, Taobao and Douyin, are all mini-app platforms; WeChat's mini-programs alone reach 962M monthly users. Where a claimed host failed our check, like Amap or Meituan, we cut it.
The second table has a pattern: almost every significant 2026 update is about AI agents driving mini-apps. WeChat opened its mini-programs to agents in June. Alipay converted 10,000+ services into agent skills by August. Meta shipped Business Agent, UnionPay an agentic payments protocol. Mini-apps are becoming the tools agents call.
The world's top apps no longer compete on features, they compete on how much of the user's day they absorb. The end state of that competition is the super-app: every adjacent need (shopping, payments, games, productivity) gets a mini-app surface inside.
WeChat showed the pattern (2017). 4.3 million mini-programs, more apps than Apple App Store and Google Play combined. Average user runs 9.8 of them per day. 945M MAU live inside the surface, not the OS.
Telegram followed (2023), TikTok joined (2025), Apple acknowledged in Nov 2025. Every billion-user messenger or super-app on Earth has either opened a mini-app surface, or is in the process of opening one.
Apple halved its commission to 15% for qualifying mini-apps hosted inside a parent native app. Tencent / WeChat signed up first. This is Apple, the strongest gatekeeper in mobile, formally embracing the super-app model that started in Asia and now ships globally.
«One pattern. Eleven hosts. The mini-app surface won.»
Native app stores reward consolidation. A ranked chart pushes each category toward one winner: one booking app takes the downloads and the other 200 fade. UGC platforms reward the opposite. YouTube does not have one cooking channel, it has millions, each personal to its creator. App supply is starting to behave the same way.
The atomic unit is the niche, not the category. A manicurist builds the booking app she actually wants, charges her clients five dollars a month, and is profitable at 100 to 1,000 users. Multiply that across masters, shops, and communities and you get 20,000 apps where a native store allows one.
So we built our store as a long-tail catalog, not a top-50 chart. Telegram alone already carries 8,000-plus of these apps, each with a small, committed audience. We do not need one app to win a category; we need tens of thousands, each good for its own people.
Native app stores reward consolidation. One «manicure booking» app wins; the other 19,999 die.
UGC platforms reward diversity. YouTube doesn't have one cooking video, it has millions, each personal to its creator. Instagram doesn't have one travel-photographer, it has billions, each with their own aesthetic and tribe.
UGC apps follow the same shape. One manicurist makes the booking app she actually wants to use. She charges her clients $5/mo. She forwards her audience to her favorite product-review app for kickbacks. Her audience is small (100-1,000). She's profitable.
Apps Store is not a top-50 ranked list. It's a long-tail catalog of micro-niches. 8K+ apps today on Telegram alone. 100K+ by end of 2027. Each one's audience is small but committed.
«One coffee shop. One booking app for that shop. One product page that ranks for that neighborhood. The atomic unit of UGC apps is the niche, not the category.»
We size the market from the buyer out. Creators spend from a $480B economy: Goldman Sachs put creator-economy spend at $250B in 2024, roughly doubling to $480B by 2027. That spend comes from 200-300M creators worldwide, per Linktree and Adobe, about 50M of them professional.
Our serviceable market is the creator tools budget, summed from named analyst segments: AI and no-code app platforms at $45B growing to $102B by 2030 (Grand View Research), social-media management at $36B (Grand View), monetization platforms at $14B and creator infrastructure at $25-38B (The Business Research Company). The sum is $120-133B; segments overlap, so we quote $100B+.
We target $1B+ a year: 1% of that budget top-down, cross-checked bottom-up at roughly 500K paying creators worth ~$2K each, which is 0.2% of the creator base. China already proves the model monetizes: WeChat mini-programs move over $1T a year (Tencent, Q3 2024).
The frame. Creators are the buyer; apps are the next thing they ship and monetize. We size the money around that: the economy they spend from (TAM), the tools budget we bill against (SAM), and the share we can realistically take first (SOM).
Total addressable market - $480B. Goldman Sachs (2023): creator-economy spend $250B, roughly doubling to ~$480B by 2027 - still the most recognizable figure in the room. Independent 2026 reports put the market at $310-323B today growing to ~$820B by 2030 (26% CAGR), i.e. actuals run at or above Goldman’s trajectory. The people: 200-300M creators worldwide - primary studies are Linktree (2022, 200M+) and Adobe Future of Creativity (2022, 303M); no newer primary census exists, 2026 aggregates re-confirm the range. Of those, ~50M are professional/semi-professional (Goldman Sachs) - the 200-300M and 50M are one population at two cut-offs, not two claims.
Serviceable addressable market - $100B+/yr: the creator tools budget, not the developer one. We sell to creators, so the serviceable market is every tool a creator pays for across the launch cycle, from named analysts (2026): AI/no-code app-building platforms $44.6B in 2026 growing to $101.7B by 2030 at 22.5% CAGR (Grand View Research; other 2026 estimates range $29-49B - Mordor, Fortune BI). The vibe-coding sub-segment is the fastest-growing at ~65% YoY, and 63% of AI app-builder users are non-developers (2026 industry data) - i.e. the budget is shifting to exactly our buyer · social-media management $36.4B (Grand View; up to $40B per Research and Markets) · creator-monetization platforms $13.94B in 2026, from $11.57B in 2025, 20.5% CAGR, to $29.07B by 2030 (Research and Markets, Creator Monetization Platform Market Report 2026) · creator tools & infrastructure (AI tools, analytics, creator-management software) $25-38B (8-12% of creator-economy value, Research and Markets). The sum is $120-133B; segments overlap, so we quote conservatively $100B+. The AI-builder wedge is the fastest-growing part, and it is the wedge we enter through.
Serviceable obtainable market - $1B+/yr. Top-down: ~1% of the $100B+ creator tools budget - defensible because a full-cycle platform bills against four segments of that budget simultaneously (build, growth, monetization, analytics), not one. Bottom-up cross-check from the creator side: an average paying creator on the full cycle is worth ~$2K/yr - build subscription plus growth tools (social-media management runs $50-300/mo standalone) plus a take on monetization (the Shopify model: subscriptions + payments yield ~$2-3K/yr per merchant). $1B/yr ÷ $2K = ~500K paying creators - only 0.2% of the 200-300M creator base. Both counts land on the same number from opposite directions. We deliberately do not build SOM on platform GMV estimates - Telegram vendor numbers are unauditable.
Source note. "Research and Markets" is a report reseller; the underlying research house for the monetization and infra segments is The Business Research Company (2026 reports) - we cite the author, not the storefront.
China in the numbers strip. China is the proof of what the app layer looks like at maturity, not a source of Western math: Tencent reports Weixin Mini Programs GMV above ¥2 trillion in a single quarter (Q3 2024) - a $1T+/yr commerce layer inside one app; 1.02B people in China use mini-apps monthly (QuestMobile, Jun 2026); WeChat alone hosts ~4.3M mini-programs - more than App Store and Google Play combined; mini-games, one category, did ¥53.5B (+34% YoY) in 2025.
Claude Code
Cursor
Copilot
Codex
The matrix maps vibe-coding tools across three surfaces, web, native, and messenger mini-apps, and four layers: base AI coding, turn-key builders, infrastructure, and launch tools. Web and native are dense at every layer, with a dozen mass-market builders each and mature infra and launch stacks behind them.
The messenger column empties below the build layer. Turn-key builders barely exist there; what does exist is platform-owned dev kits or single-ecosystem niche tools. There is no third-party messenger-native infrastructure, and launch tooling, attribution, push, subscriptions, has not been built at all. The further down the stack, the emptier it gets.
That gap is a category, not a feature, and @appss Pro is the full stack built for it: sixteen tools from market research and AI builder through cloud, app store, attribution, push, and support. Build is commodity. We sell what comes after, natively, across iOS, Android, and the messenger surfaces.
Base AI tools cover everything, slowly. Builders cover web and native. Infra + launch tools cover web and native. Below the build layer, mini-apps are abandoned. That's the blue ocean. @appssPro is the full stack, built for it.
Row ①, Base AI coding works everywhere (Claude Code can write iOS code, web React, or a Telegram bot). But it's slow, manual, and the creator carries every decision. Few non-devs use it productively.
Row ②, Builders compress weeks to hours by bundling decisions + infra. Web and native have a dozen mass-market players each. Messenger mini-apps have almost no turn-key builders, what exists is either platform-owned dev kits (WeChat Devtools, LIFF, TikTok H5) or niche tools that target one ecosystem and one use case (SODA = TG memecoin games; ManyChat = WA flows).
Row ③, Infrastructure for messengers is structurally different. Each super-app gatekeeps its own runtime. You don't pick «hosting»; you deploy to Tencent / Meta / TikTok endpoints, or self-host the webview on Vercel. No third-party «messenger-native infra-as-a-service» exists.
Row ④, Launch tools. This is the deepest gap. Web has Mixpanel + Stripe + OneSignal + Customer.io. Native has AppsFlyer + Adjust + RevenueCat. For messenger mini-apps: Mixpanel works if you wire it manually; nothing else has been built. No AppsFlyer equivalent, no push-orchestration, no native subscription management, no creator-attribution layer. That's where @appssPro plays.
The further down the stack you go, the more domain-specific tooling becomes. The further down the messenger column you go, the emptier it gets. The gap isn't a feature, it's an entire category.
«Build is commodity. We sell what comes after, natively, for the surface no one else serves.»
This slide is the demo. We recorded a full walkthrough of @appss Pro and put the video on the slide itself. In the live deck it plays right inside the frame; on an exported copy, the QR code and the YouTube link open the same video on your phone.
It is the real product, not a storyboard. The walkthrough follows what a creator sees and does inside @appss Pro, screen by screen, from the first login onward. We would rather let the interface carry the argument than compress it into bullets.
Everything before this point in the deck is reasoning. The demo is the evidence. If a reader takes one thing away, we want it to be a few minutes inside the product, watched at their own pace, on their own device.
Scan the QR or open on YouTube to watch the full walkthrough. In the live deck, hit play to watch it right here in the frame.



NotSpy recovers deleted and edited Telegram messages. Over the last three months it reached 715K users and $9.5K in MRR, with 2.4M views a month. It is the largest app on the platform, and it grew inside Telegram, where the audience already was.
KAVA Food serves recipes with calories and macros per portion. Last month it counted 11.8K users, $540 in MRR, and 940K views. A small, focused utility that a creator could not have justified as a native app; as a mini-app the economics work.
abcdVPN sells one-tap VPN subscriptions inside Telegram. Last month, 300 users produced $1,200 in MRR. Three hundred users is not a big number, and that is the point: with payments native to the surface, an app this small is already a business.
Three creator-built apps on the platform: NotSpy (message recovery), KAVA Food (recipes with macros), abcdVPN (VPN subscriptions in Telegram). Numbers: users, MRR and views over the last three months. [Numbers pending from Mark.]
The base is the subscription. Each plan includes a monthly credit budget of around 3,000 credits, and every tool draws it down: research queries, builds, remixes, pushes. AI tools are priced at cost times two, infra and ops tools at three to five, so revenue tracks real usage and margin grows with scale.
The second stream is aggregated traffic. Apps built on the platform funnel their audience through the @appss store, and that Store MAU becomes inventory we sell per impression and per outcome, to Pro creators and external advertisers. More apps means more traffic to sell; the first stream feeds the second.
The third is partner flows. When creators and influencers make deals through the platform, we take a cut of each one: a fee per Influencer Market order, a percentage of referral-program budgets. Each stream raises the others, so a marketing dollar spent acquiring one subscriber ends up working across all three.
Credit model. Credits are the internal meter. The subscription includes a monthly Credit budget; every tool - build, assets, API/LLM calls, market research, push - consumes Credits, so revenue tracks real usage. Overage is pure-margin top-ups. Per-app × per-team: 5 portfolio apps = 5 subscriptions.
Aggregator economics. Notspy did 115K users on stack 1.0; next-gen apps could do 1M+ each. Their audience passes through the @appss store to discover apps and becomes Store MAU, which we resell as targeted impressions + outcomes to Pro creators and external advertisers. One unicorn funds the rest.
Partner take-rate. Influencer Market fee per booking, partner-program split per conversion, bounty cut on payout - each compounds with app count and Store MAU.
We don't own equity in creators' apps. We don't try to. We own the audience-aggregation layer underneath them. Creators get the best tools, best store distribution, best monetization. We get the economics under all of it. Both win.
«SaaS floor, aggregator ceiling, no cap - one app's success funds a hundred others.»
We brought the platform online piece by piece. The Analytics SDK shipped in April and has since counted 882K end-users served across creators' apps. Market Research followed in May. In total, the AI tools have handled 11.2K actions across 2,181 creator accounts, and 850 apps built elsewhere came in to list with us.
The AI Builder was the last piece. It launched on July 31 and closed the loop: a creator can now build, publish, measure, and monetize in one place. The response was immediate. In under four weeks, creators built 394 apps from scratch in the Builder.
Monetization switched on last. 123 users now pay, at about $115 average spend. The base is small and recent, and we treat these numbers as groundwork: each metric started at zero when its tool shipped, and August is the first month the complete loop has been running.
We do not rent distribution. We run 44 owned influencer accounts across Instagram, TikTok, YouTube and Telegram, with 78K followers and 46.7M views all time. The largest single account has done 15.6M views. Every one of them was grown in house, by our own team, on our own content.
These accounts already work as a channel. They route audience into our own apps and monetize them, so the engine pays for itself while it proves the loop. Track Socials, Influencer Market, Referral System and Channel Attribution inside @appss Pro are the same tooling we use ourselves.
The next step is the market. The same accounts, plus the community around them, will push creators' apps built on our platform. Ad budgets buy reach once. Owned accounts compound, and they pump the market we take a cut of.
Mark Okhman, CEO + founder. Operator-founder, not technical-founder. Multi-year inside the Telegram ecosystem, shipped portfolio apps on top of the substrate (Notspy 115K users live). Owns positioning, fundraising, partnerships, product narrative.
Anton Strekalov, CMO. The marketing engine. Generated the inbound that drove early @appssPro signups (tens of millions of views across IG / TG / YT). Owns the creator-acquisition pipeline + Anton's network of Telegram operators.
Maksim Zhers, CTO. Senior engineer with deep Telegram Mini Apps experience. Owns architecture: builder, hosting, push, store, scoring. The backend that survives 1M+ push deliveries and 49K reviews.
You need (a) an operator-founder who eats own stack, (b) a marketer who can recruit creators by their language, (c) an engineer who's already shipped at this substrate's depth. Together = an extremely tight execution machine for the Telegram + messenger-ecosystem play. Each role is irreplaceable.
«Founder + driver + builder. Backed by an investor (Loom) who's been on this thesis since Day 1.»
Twelve of the sixteen tools are live today. APIs & LLMs and the Influencer Market ship in September; Designer Studio and Support close the set in October. From that point the product surface is complete, and the work shifts entirely to distribution. That is the whole game for the next two quarters.
Distribution runs platform by platform. Reddit and WhatsApp in September; YouTube, TikTok and Discord in October; Instagram, Messenger, Facebook and iMessage in November. WeChat, LINE and Zalo follow in December, with Alipay, Douyin and Weibo through the first quarter. The West first, then China, in the order access opens.
The numbers are outputs of a loop, not a forecast. Each platform adds creators, each app becomes a template others remix, and remixes carry into the next platform. Run at this cadence, that loop is built to produce one million mini-apps by year-end and three million by March. Targets, not promises.
Planned content: remaining tools (Designer Studio, Support, Stories, Bounty...), dates, and the compounding argument from the Traction slide continued.




We are operators, not observers. Before building the platform we shipped our own apps on the Telegram substrate; Notspy alone runs at 115K users. The stack we sell is the stack we use daily, so every tool exists because one of our own apps needed it first.
The team fits the problem three ways. Mark, ex-Telegram team and TON Foundation, runs product and positioning as an operator-founder. Anton has generated billions of organic views on Instagram, TikTok and YouTube and recruits creators in their own language. Max built at Telegram Mini Apps depth and owns the platform.
This market is won from inside the ecosystems, and our 15+ teammates already work there: UGC operators, growth engineers and mini-app developers embedded in Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and Meta. @loomdart, co-founder and early backer, has been on this thesis since day one.
Mark Okhman, CEO + founder. Operator-founder, not technical-founder. Multi-year inside the Telegram ecosystem, shipped portfolio apps on top of the substrate (Notspy 115K users live). Owns positioning, fundraising, partnerships, product narrative.
Anton Strekalov, CMO. The marketing engine. Generated the inbound that drove early @appssPro signups (tens of millions of views across IG / TG / YT). Owns the creator-acquisition pipeline + Anton's network of Telegram operators.
Maksim Zhers, CTO. Senior engineer with deep Telegram Mini Apps experience. Owns architecture: builder, hosting, push, store, scoring. The backend that survives 1M+ push deliveries and 49K reviews.
You need (a) an operator-founder who eats own stack, (b) a marketer who can recruit creators by their language, (c) an engineer who's already shipped at this substrate's depth. Together = an extremely tight execution machine for the Telegram + messenger-ecosystem play. Each role is irreplaceable.
«Founder + driver + builder. Backed by an investor (Loom) who's been on this thesis since Day 1.»
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